Electronic Chart Display and Information System-Navy: analysis and recommendations by Schweighardt, Edward Joseph.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-06
Electronic Chart Display and Information
System-Navy: analysis and recommendations.
Schweighardt, Edward Joseph.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10894
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
ELECTRONIC CHART DISPLAY AND INFORMATION 
SYSTEM - NAVY: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
by 




Joseph G. San Miguel 
John E. Mutty 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
20010807 027 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 
June 2001 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Electronic Chart Display and Information System - 
Navy: Analysis and Recommendations 
6. AUTHOR(S) Edward Joseph Schweighardt 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 




9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13, ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
In 1998 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the U.S. Navy to begin a transition from 
navigating using conventional paper charts, to the use of an electronic charting system (digital 
charts). In response, the Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems-Navy (ECDIS-N) 
instruction was issued. This new technology will presumably reduce or prevent future collision 
and grounding incidents associated with navigational errors. The objective of this study is to 
determine the best possible ECDIS-N capable system or systems that will meet the future needs 
of the Navy. Also examined, are the possible annual repair cost savings that an ECDIS-N 
system could realize for the Navy. Data for two different periods of Navy collisions and 
groundings were compared and used to estimate the average incidents per ship and the average 
annual repair cost incurred by the Navy. The cost, capabilities and limitations of alternative 
ECDIS-N systems are evaluated in a cost-benefit comparison that justifies the Navy's 
implementation of certain ECDIS-N systems in different classes of ships. It is estimated that 
an ECDIS-N system integrated with an Automatic Radar Plotting Aid could have prevented 
47% of the Navy's collisions and groundings from 1998 to 2000, saving 96.4% of the 
combined repairs costs. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Electronic Charting and Digital Navigation 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES      8g 
















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
ELECTRONIC CHART DISPLAY AND INFORMATION SYSTEM - NAVY: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Edward Joseph Schweighardt 
Lieutenant, United States Naval Reserves 
B.S., Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 1994 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2001 
Author: &&JO*c£ J. ■ ScL.MuJ* 
Edward Joseph Schweighardt 
Approved by: 
G. San Miguel, Thesis Advisor 
Kenneth J. Euske, Dean 
raduate School of Business and Public Policy 
m 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
In 1998 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the U.S. Navy to begin a transition 
from navigating using conventional paper charts, to the use of an electronic charting 
system (digital charts). In response, the Electronic Chart Display and Information 
Systems-Navy (ECDIS-N) instruction was issued. This new technology will presumably 
reduce or prevent future collision and grounding incidents associated with navigational 
errors. The objective of this study is to determine the best possible ECDIS-N capable 
system or systems that will meet the future needs of the Navy. Also examined, are the 
possible annual repair cost savings that an ECDIS-N system could realize for the Navy. 
Data for two different periods of Navy collisions and groundings were compared and 
used to estimate the average incidents per ship and the average annual repair cost 
incurred by the Navy. The cost, capabilities and limitations of alternative ECDIS-N 
systems are evaluated in a cost-benefit comparison that justifies the Navy's 
implementation of certain ECDIS-N systems in different classes of ships. It is estimated 
that an ECDIS-N system integrated with an Automatic Radar Plotting Aid could have 
prevented 47% of the Navy's collisions and groundings from 1998 to 2000, saving 96.4% 
of the combined repairs costs. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
The art of successfully traveling from one location to another is termed 
"Navigation". Since ancient times man has been particularly dependant on the oceans for 
commerce, foodstuffs and security. As a result, throughout history expertise at Marine 
Navigation has been a necessity for all great civilizations. Over time, advances in 
technology have evolved Marine Navigation from an imprecise and primitive practice to 
a highly accurate and sophisticated process. Some milestones in the history and 
development of Marine Navigation are: the creating of Celestial Navigation almanacs, 
refinements of paper charts, the magnetic compass, invention of the time-piece, ability to 
navigate with Longitude, Satellite Navigation, and the introduction of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS). With the exception of GPS, all previous forms of navigation 
were time consuming and their calculations prone to human error. 
The development of GPS was a unique landmark for Marine Navigation. GPS 
greatly increased the accuracy and speed in calculating a ship's exact location. However, 
with this precise navigational data available to mariners, human error was still a factor. 
This is due to the dependence on conventional paper charts. U.S. Navy Navigation teams 
must still transfer GPS receiver outputs onto paper charts, a process that can take 
approximately 30 to 60 seconds. Since the deregulation of GPS in 1984 by President 
Ronald Reagan, commercial development and employment of the system has become 
extensive, especially in the field of Marine Navigation. The world's merchant fleets 
began utilizing and transitioning to digital charts in the early to mid-1990s. Navigation 
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with digital charts removes human error and the need to transfer GPS receiver outputs 
onto paper charts. Also, it presents the user with real time positional information. 
On 20 July 2000, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), 
PMW 187-4, issued a report entitled "Analysis of Alternatives For Electronic Charting 
for Navy Surface Ships". This report compared and contrasted alternative electronic 
charting systems available to the Navy and their probable cost. Navy officials have also 
used the criteria presented in the report for assessing potential ECDIS-N systems. 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) letter of 17 March 1998 "US Navy 
Electronic Chart Display and Information System Policy" (ECDIS-N) directed the U.S. 
Navy to begin a transition from navigating using conventional paper charts to the use of 
an electronic navigation system (digital charts). This transition to a new technology 
would presumably prevent or reduce future collisions and groundings associated with 
navigational errors and decrease the workload and costs related to the maintenance of a 
conventional paper chart shipboard library. 
The CNO also has an ambitious agenda of making "paperless navigation" a reality 
in the surface and submarine communities by 2004. To help meet this goal the standards 
and minimum requirements for all ECDIS-N systems were developed in the January 2001 
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVTNST) 9420.2, known as the "ECDIS-N 
Instruction". In order to centralize Naval efforts to meet ECDIS-N requirements, the 
CNO has designated OPNAV (N096) as the first Navigator of the Navy. As stated by the 
CNO (Ref. 3): 
The Navigator of the Navy will establish standards for navigation used by all 
Navy units with the goal of improving safety, efficiency and interoperability with other 
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DOD systems, allied and the international maritime industry. Fleet CINCS remain 
responsible for implementation policy and the Navigator of the Navy will serve as their 
technical expert. 
As can be imagined, the cost of outfitting the entire fleet with an ECDIS-N 
capable system by FY04 could prove to be financially expensive to the Navy. It is 
therefore imperative to ensure that the money is spent effectively so that the new system 
performs in accordance with the guidelines of OPNAVINST 9420.2, especially in these 
times of heightened cost consciousness. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the best possible ECDIS-N capable 
system or systems that will meet the future needs of the U.S. Navy. The cost, capabilities 
and limitations of the SPAWAR Navigation Sensor System Interface (NAVSSI), 
Offshore Systems International Ltd. Electronic Chart Precise Integrated Navigation 
System - Military (ECPINS-M), Raytheon Pathfinder MK2 and the Litton Marine VMS- 
2100M will be compared and evaluated to determine the best possible product for the unit 
cost. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: Which navigation system or systems are the 
most cost effective and beneficial to the Navy in meeting ECDIS-N requirements and 
what are the future growth potentials? 
Secondary research questions are: 
• How will ECDIS-N benefit the Navy? 
• What are the costs associated with maintaining current conventional chart 
inventories on naval vessels? 
• What are the costs associated with the existing collision and grounding 
rates of Naval Vessels and what would be the cost savings that an 
employed ECDIS and Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) system 
could provide? 
• What system or systems should the Navy employ to meet ECDIS-N 
requirements? 
D.       SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
This study will be divided into two major sections. First, a description of each 
ECDIS-N capable system will be presented and described and then an associated cost per 
unit will be assigned. Second, an analysis of costs and benefits will be presented and 
compared for each system. Data from the cost-benefit comparison will then be 
interpreted and recommendations and conclusions will be derived and presented. 
2. Limitations 
Although numerous other ECDIS capable systems are available in the civilian 
sector, this study will be limited to the following four ECDIS capable systems: NAVSSI, 
ECPINS-M, Pathfinder MK2 and the VMS-2100M. These systems were selected 
because they are the closest to meeting ECDIS-N requirements and are already deployed 
on a variety of U.S. Naval and Coast Guard vessels. 
Private sector data concerning individual ECDIS-N unit costs were difficult, and 
in some cases impossible, to obtain from the manufacturer due to the data containing 
proprietary information. Therefore, all costs and system capabilities associated with 
Offshore Systems International Ltd. ECPINS-M, Raytheon Pathfinder and Litton Marine 
VMS-2100M were obtained directly from fleet units and various Program Managers. 
Additionally, no attempt was made in this study to either verify or refute individual 
company claims on the capabilities and effectiveness of their respective products. 
All data concerning Research and Development (R&D) and unit installation cost 
have been omitted from this study, as SPAWAR was the only organization to divulge this 
information relating to their product. 
This study originally intended to include the cost of initial outfitting and the costs 
of maintaining a conventional paper chart inventory onboard U.S. Naval vessels. These 
costs would have been determined for a typical two-year deployment cycle and would 
have been modeled on a DDG-51 Arleigh Burke platform. Liaison was established with 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), but the requested individual ship 
expenses for a deployment cycle were too difficult to differentiate from the overall 
budget. The cost of maintaining a conventional chart inventory per ship, plus the average 
yearly expenses incurred from collisions and groundings would have been the cost of 
"doing nothing". However, NIMA did provide information relating to the unit cost of the 
different categories of charts found on Naval vessels and this information is displayed in 
Table 3.6. Based on this information, a rough calculation was performed in order to 
estimate the average yearly cost. 
The total number of United States Naval Ships (USNS) operated by the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC) amounts to 116 active ships, with 20 vessels either planned or 
under construction. All USNS ships were excluded from this study because, the MSC 
budget for Acquisition does not come directly out of the Department of the Navy (DON) 
Budget. 
Also excluded from this study are all ships of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and 
the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NRD). This force of ships is maintained by the U.S. 
Maritime Administration (MARAD) and represents the largest amount of strategic sealift 
capability available to the Department of Defense (DOD).   The reason for exclusion is 
because the Department of Transportation (DOT) funds MARAD's budget. 
Three different categories of fleet units were excluded from this study for various 
reasons. Table 1.1 lists the categories, the classes of ships and the number of ships not 
observed. It is important to show the number of fleet units excluded from this study and 
the reason why. Data was gathered from (Refs. 8 &12-14). 
• All SSN and SSBN units have an installed Litton VMS-2100M ECDIS-N 
system or are under an already purchased contract for future installation. 
Therefore all submarine ECDIS-N unit costs will be considered "sunk 
costs" and are irrelevant to this study. 
• All CV, CVN, LHD and LHA class ships are not subject to this study 
because they historically are outfitted with a more expensive and capable 
ECDIS-N package that smaller classes of ships are not equipped with. 
Further analysis has revealed that the cost of each individual ECDIS-N 
package has also varied between ships of the same class, especially the 
carriers. Consequently the excluded classes of ships reported in Table 1.1 
represent 10.8% of the observed surface fleet of 214 vessels, hi order for 
this study to be effective it is imperative to compare and evaluate only 
similar systems of like capabilities. 
Category Class Active 
Number 














Total 102 94 8 
Table 1.1.       Ship Classes Not Observed In Study. 
3.        Assumptions 
A large number of naval ships will receive an ECDIS-N capable system. For the 
purposes of this thesis it is assumed that the cost per unit of the various ECDIS-N 
systems will remain relatively the same between the observed classes of ships. 
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It is also assumed, that the crew is properly trained and capable of operating an 
ECDIS-N system when calculating possible cost savings per year from collision and 
grounding avoidance. Also, it is presumed that an ECDIS-N system will be more likely 
to prevent groundings and an ARPA is more useful in preventing collisions. 
E.       ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized and divided into five chapters. Chapter I consists of the 
introduction and background of this study. Chapter II provides a discussion of the 
information sources and collection methods used in executing this research. Chapter HI 
provides a detailed description of the different ECDIS systems assessed and their 
associated cost per unit. Also examined in this chapter are the number and cost of naval 
collisions and groundings and the estimated cost savings that an employed ECDIS-N 
system could have realized. Chapter IV provides an analysis of the data presented in 
Chapter El concerning ship collisions and groundings and also analyzes the cost of each 
ECDIS system and their potential future benefit to the Navy. Chapter V will summarize 
the findings, draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the data analysis. 
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II.     RESEARCH METHODS 
A.       NAVY ECDIS-N SYSTEM INFORMATION 
1. Collection Method 
The primary source of data for NAVSSI was obtained from a field visit to the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, PMW 187-4, located in San Diego, CA. 
Personal interviews were conducted with the Assistant Program Manager, the Assistant 
Program Manager for Electronic Charting and the Fleet Liaison. In addition, further 
information was obtained from the NAVSSI web page, the ECDIS-N "Work-Group" and 
through correspondence with various fleet units. 
2. Sample Characteristics 
NAVSSI is deployed in two distinct versions, the first is the standard NAVSSI 
installation suite and the second is NAVSSI Lite. The standard NAVSSI suite 
incorporates hardware, which distributes positional and navigational information to the 
ship's combat systems and also incorporates the U.S. Coast Guard developed Command 
Display and Control (COMDAC) integrated navigation system. The capacity of 
COMDAC to perform electronic charting and navigation are the only segments of 
NAVSSI which are analyzed and relevant to this study. 
NAVSSI Lite was designed for ships which do not require the capabilities of, or 
have space available to install the full NAVSSI installation suite. This version of 
NAVSSI is being considered for installation on approximately 70 vessels and is a less 
expensive alternative to NAVSSI. One major performance limitation with NAVSSI Lite 
is that it does not have the capability to interface with an Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
(ARPA) or project Radar Image Overlays. 
B.       CIVILIAN ECDIS-N SYSTEM INFORMATION 
1.        Collection Method 
Information relating to the civilian sector ECDIS systems (ECPINS-M, Pathfinder 
and VMS 2100M) was predominantly obtained through three main sources.   The first 
source was OPNAV N961 "Assistant Navigator of the Navy", the second source was 
PMS 400 "Smart Ship Office", and the third source was information obtained from the 
respective corporations' public releases or publicly available information on the Internet. 
Furthermore, additional information was obtained through fleet units, but this secondary 
source was principally used to support data gathered from the previous three sources. 
Interviews were conducted and e-mail correspondence was established with 
several representatives from each corporation involved in manufacturing the ECDIS 
systems. Theses sources failed to produce any meaningful data needed for this study. 
2.        Sample Characteristics 
The civilian ECDIS-N systems are available to the Navy with many extra features 
outside of their standard models.  These special features add significantly to the cost of 
the system and are mainly found on CV, CVN, LHD and LHA platforms, which were 
excluded from this study as explained in Chapter I. 
C.       FLEET CHARACTERISTICS 
1.        Collection Method 
Fleet data concerning the different types and classes of Navy ships and the 
number of each were obtained from five primary sources: Jane's "Fighting Ships 2000- 
2001" (Ref. 8), the U.S. Navy Office of Information listing of Fleet units (Ref. 12), 
Commander,   Naval   Surface   Forces   Atlantic   (COMNAVSURFALNT)   (Ref.   13), 
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Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific (COMNAVSURPAC) (Ref. 14) listing of 
fleet units and the Navy Historical Center (Ref. 26). 
2.        Sample Size of Fleet 
Six different categories of Naval ships were used to gather data for this study. 
Table 2.1 contains a summary of the different categories and the classes of ships which 
comprise them. Also included are the active number of ships in each category and the 
number of planned and under construction vessels. The largest category consists of 111 
active combatants, with 12 vessels under construction. Combatants represent over half of 
the 214 ships included in the sample under examination. Planned or under construction 
ships are important to this analysis, because they eventually will be introduced to the fleet 
and will require an ECDIS-N system. Also, some precommissioning ships are having an 
ECDIS-N system installed, while under construction. 
Category Class Active 
Number 
Planned or Under 
Construction 
Combatants CG, DD, DDG, FFG 111 12 
Amphibious LPD, LSD, LST 27 12 
Command Ships LCC, AGF, MCS 4 
Patrol Craft PC 9 
Mine Warfare MCS, MCM, MHC 25 
Support Ships AOE, AS, ARS 14 
Total 214 190 24 
Table 2.1.       Ship Classes Observed In Study. 
11 
D.       U.S. NAVY SHIP COLLISION AND GROUNDING DATA 
1.        Historical Data 1946 -1988 
a. Collection Method 
Information and data reflecting the historical trend of U.S. Navy collisions 
and groundings were obtained from one primary source, the Greenpeace Institute for 
Policy Studies, which cited all Navy accidents from 1945 - 1988 (Ref. 4). The 
Greenpeace Institute obtained this information from official U.S. Navy records using the 
procedures required by the Freedom of Information Act to access Naval archives. 
b. Analysis of Data 
This historical data is examined, calculated and then reported in a series of 
tables and charts in Chapter m. This included the total number of collisions, groundings 
and incidents for the 43-year period and also the average number of each. Further 
analysis was conducted to determine the ratio of incidents per ship and the number of 
ships for every one incident. Once the data was properly presented, the information was 
analyzed and to establish historical trends. 
A regression analysis was conducted on the sample to determine if there 
was a relationship between the number of incidents per year and the fleet size. Two 
additional regression analyses were conducted between incidents per year and the 
deployed and non-deployed steaming days per quarter, from 1970 - 1988. Information 
pertaining to steaming days per quarter was obtained from the 2001 DON Budget (Ref. 
6). 
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2.        Current Data 1998 - 2000 
a. Collection Method 
Information and repair costs for Navy collisions and groundings between 
1998 - 2000 were collected from the U.S. Naval Safety Center located in Norfolk, VA 
(Ref. 5). 
b. Analysis of Data 
A complete review of U.S. Navy ship collisions and groundings was 
conducted for the three-year period, FY98-00. The data was screened for incidents, 
which could possibly have been prevented if an ECDIS-N system and an ARPA were 
properly utilized by trained watch-teams. Conservative judgment was then used to 
decide whether each incident should be classified as either preventable or non- 
preventable. Next, the appropriate cost to repair was assigned to each preventable 
incident. The costs for the preventable incidents were then summed and presented as the 
total cost for repairs and the potential DON savings for the 3-year period being examined. 
These cost figures and operating data were then analyzed and the historical and recent 
data were compared. This data was further examined, calculated and presented to include 
the: collisions per year, groundings per year, incidents per year, incidents per ship and the 
ships for every one incident. 
13 
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III.    DATA PRESENTATION 
This chapter is divided into four sections labeled A thru D, and presents all data 
that will be used for further analyses in Chapter IV. Section A will present data for 
Historic and Current collisions and groundings, provide a cost in dollars for repairs and 
also analyze the cost of the "doing nothing" option that is the baseline for subsequent cost 
analyses. Section B provides a brief description of the evaluated ECDIS-N systems and 
their respective unit cost. Section C lists the various major attributes of each ECDIS-N 
system, for the purposes of comparison across the available options. The last section D, 
provides a snapshot of the ships in the fleet that were examined fleet and the numbers of 
each ECDIS-N system that are installed. 
A.       NAVY COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS 
Historical data on U.S. Navy collisions and groundings from 1946 to 1988 will be 
presented first, followed by the U.S. Navy collisions and groundings data from 1998 to 
2000, the most recent period for which data were available. The former data will be 
referred to as the "Historical" data and the latter will be referred to as the "Current" data. 
The last area to be covered in this section is the cost associated with the option of "doing 
nothing", that is continuing the status quo for electronic charting equipment and systems. 
Note: All historical data used in the following tables and charts were derived from 
two sources. (Refs. 4 and 26). 
1.        Historical Trend of Navy Collisions and Groundings 
The 43-year observed period, 1946 - 1988, represents a long-term portrait of the 
post World War II historical trend of Navy collision and grounding incidents. While the 
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main focus of this study concerning collisions and groundings is to examine and analyze 
the total number of incidents between 1998 - 2000, it is necessary to compare this data to 
historical incidents to determine how it correlates to former trends. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the 43 years covered by the Historic data in terms of the 










Table 3.1.       Navy Ship Collision and Grounding Data 1946 - 1988. 
Charts 3.1 and 3.2 each graphically display the number of collisions and 
groundings per year. Observe the cyclical nature of the charts and the 43-year average 
represented by the horizontal line. 
Collisions 1946 -1988 
•Collisions —43 Year Average 
20 
15 
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1946 1953 1960 1967 1974 1981 1988 
Chart 3.1.       Total Collisions per Year. 
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Groundings 1946 -1988 
■ Groundings —43 Year Average 
Average = 3,02 
1960 
Chart 3.2.       Total Groundings per Year. 
Chart 3.3 is a combination of Charts 3.1 and 3.2 without the 43-year averages. 
The combination of the two charts allows the relationship of the annual collisions and 
groundings to be observed. Notice that for some years there is no association between 
the two phenomena. That is, collisions may have an increase or decrease from one year 
to the next for a given year but groundings move in the opposite direction. 
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Collisions & Groundings 1946 - 1988 
•Collisions -—Groundings I 
Chart 3.3.       Total Collisions and Groundings per Year. 
Chart 3.4 is a graphical display of the addition of collisions and groundings for 
the 43-year period and is represented as the Total Incidents per Year. Notice the high 
variability of the chart. It is important to note that over the years that low points tend to 
maintain higher values. This suggests that the number of incidents per year is increasing 
over time. 
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Total Incidents 1946 -1988 
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Chart 3.4.       Total Incidents per Year. 
To determine if there is a connection between fleet size and the annual number of 
incidents, the Navy active fleet size is provided. This data can be observed in Chart 3.5, 
which covers the years 1946 - 1988. Notice the steep decline in fleet size immediately 
following the conclusion of World War II. This is soon followed by the urgent build-up 
of ships needed for the prosecution of the Korean War, and notice another decline after 
the armistices in 1953. Two other increases in fleet size can be observed for the post 
World War II era. These are for the Vietnam War cresting in 1967 and the slight increase 
in ships in the 1980's as a result of the "Reagan build-up". One other important feature 
of this chart is the steady decline of the fleet from 1953 onwards. 
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Chart 3.5.       Active Duty Fleet Size 1946 -1988. 
Chart 3.6 exhibits the Navy's Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) in Deployed and 
Non-deployed steaming days per quarter, from 1970 - 2000. The horizontal lines are the 
OPTEMO budgeted goals. Disparity between goals and actual steaming days represent 
real world operations and commitments. Notice after 1979 that Non-deployed steaming 
days tend to linger at or below budgeted goals, while deployed steaming days remain 
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Chart 3.6.       Active Force Operations Tempo per Year, 1970 - 2000. From (Ref. 6) 
Charts 3.7 and 3.8 respectively, represent the number of incidents per ship and the 
number of ships for every one incident. Notice on Chart 3.7 the rising trend line in the 
number of incidents per ship every year. This implies that the Navy is progressively 
getting worse at driving ships. For the most part, the trend line maintained itself well 
above average after 1967. This calculation is obtained by dividing the total incidents per 
year by the fleet size for that year. Chart 3.8 represents the number of ships for every one 
incident. This data was obtained by dividing the fleet size for a given year by the number 
of incidents for that year. Again, observe the features of the chart and that, over time, the 
numbers decrease or becomes worse. This supports Chart 3.7. 
The charts may be confusing to interpret, and at first glance do not appear to be 
related, but they are both inverses of one another, hi fact, observe on Chart 3.8 that after 
1967 the trend of incidents remains below the 43-year average, and that peaks and 
troughs do correlate between both charts. 
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Chart 3.7.       Incidents per Ship per Year. 
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Chart 3.8.       Ships for Every One Incident per Year. 
Table 3.2 is a display of the average number of observable events that were 
presented in the preceding charts, covering 1946 - 1988. Notice that the average number 
of collisions per year represents approximately 78% of the total incidents per year. Also 
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note the average fleet size for the Historical period was 768.21 ships, which is more then 
double today's fleet. 
Type Average Number 
Collisions per Year 10.51 
Groundings per Year 3.02 
Incidents per Year 13.53 
Incidents per Ship 0.0176 
Ships for Every One Incident 56.76 
Average Fleet Size 768.21 
Table 3.2.       Average Number of Incidents 1946 - 1988. 
2.        Navy Collision and Grounding Data 1998 - 2000 
Next, the Navy collisions and grounding data for the most recent period of 
operations will be used to examine a major research question posed by this thesis. Note 
that the Naval Safety Center was the sole source of data for this section (Ref. 5). 
The information concerning collisions and groundings was carefully screened for 
possible incidents, which may have been prevented by the proper use of an ECDIS-N and 
ARPA system. Conservative judgment was placed on the classification of each incident 
as either preventable or non-preventable. Several incidents were clearly non-preventable 
for various reasons, while others could have been prevented by the employment of an 
ECDIS-N and ARPA system. However, if incidents were borderline or undecided, they 
were classified as non-preventable. Once the incidents were properly examined and 
classified, the total cost to repair was assigned to preventable incidents. 
Table 3.3 lists the breakdown of individual incidents for each of the three years 
and presents the total number of collisions, groundings and incidents for the period and 
the actual DON cost incurred for repairs.   There were four incidents in both 1998 and 
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1999 and nine in 2000, for a total of 17 incidents for the Current period. Additionally, 
the number of incidents that an ECDIS-N and ARPA system would likely have prevented 
are listed have prevented are listed. Their cost is listed in the "Possible DON Savings" 
column. 
Incident Year Collision Grounding Possible ECDIS-N 
& ARPA Prevention 

























2000 1 1 74,253,000 74,253,000 2000 1 1 41,287 41,287       1 
17 Total: 9 8 8 $157,187,514 $151,579,509 1 
Table 3.3.       Cost of Incidents 1998 - 2000. 
Table 3.4 is a display of the average number of observable details for the Current 
period taken from Table 3.3. Compare the data presented in this table to data previously 
presented in Table 3.2, which summarizes the averages for the Historical period. Notice 
the decline in the average number of collisions per year and the reduction in the average 
fleet size. 
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Type Average Number 
Collisions per Year 3.00 
Groundings per Year 2.67 
Incidents per Year 5.67 
Incidents per Ship 0.0175 
Ships per One Incident 56.94 
Average Fleet Size 322.67 
Table 3.4.       Average Number of Incidents 1998 - 2000. 
3.        Do Nothing 
The cost of collisions and groundings are relevant to this study, because it is the 
cost incurred by the Navy by "doing nothing", that is not deploying or delaying 
installation ECDIS-N and ARPA systems on vessels. This is the estimated yearly 
average cost that incurred by DON on repairs to vessels that have suffered a collision or 
grounding and that could possibly have been prevented by an ECDIS-N or ARPA system. 
The cost of "doing nothing" assumes that the trend for 1998 - 2000 remains constant as is 

















Average Yearly Preventable 
Cost 
$50,526,503 
Table 3.5. Total Number and Cost of Non-Preventable and Preventable Incidents. 
This calculation should also include the cost of maintaining conventional paper 
chart inventories. The process of navigating on paper charts is manpower intensive, and 
lags behind technology that has been available to the civilian merchant fleets since the 
early 1990s. 
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Table 3.6 represents the cost the Navy incurs when purchasing individual charts 
from NMA. Speculation on the probable Navy cost of charts could be calculated if the 
average ship receives between 400 and 600 charts per year, multiplied by the size of the 
active duty fleet. Also, one must consider the cost of initial outfitting of a 
precommissioning vessel, where it will receive an inventory of several thousand-paper 
charts. This cost would also not take into account the cost in man-hours spent correcting 
charts or the cost of navigating instruments utilized. Also included in this table is the 
cost of plotting sheets. All information on the cost of individual paper charts was 
provided by (Ref. 11). 
Chart Type Individual Chart Cost in Dollars 
International Chart Series 10.25 
Hydro Charts 17.00 
Great Circle Sailing Charts 8.50 
Great Circle Tracking Charts 8.50 
Plotting Sheets 4.00 
Universal Plotting Sheet 2.00 
Table 3.6.       Cost of Individual Paper Charts. 
B.       DESCRIPTION OF ECDIS-N SYSTEMS 
The following sections labeled one to four describe the various ECDIS-N systems 
that are examined by this study and their associated unit costs. Section one covers 
NAVSSI, Section two the Pathfinder MK2, Section three ECPINS-M and Section four 
the VMS-2100M. Each section is further divided into two subsections labeled A and B. 
Subsection A provides a description of each system, and Subsection B details individual 
unit costs. 
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1.        Navigation Sensor System Interface 
All information regarding NAVSSI system description, capabilities and unit cost 
were gathered from the following sources: (Refs. 7, 17 and 18). Also, no illustrations of 
NAVSSI Blk El Build 4 are provided in this section as only NAVSSI Blk II illustrations 
were available. 
a.        System Description 
Developed by the Marine Navigation Division at SPA WAR Center, San 
Diego, NAVSSI is a post Milestone-Ill (Production and Deployment Phase) acquisition 
program. This program utilizes Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)) hardware and 
Government-Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) and government developed software. The purpose 
of NAVSSI is to provide extremely accurate, real-time navigational information to 
onboard combat and weapons systems. This information is received from navigational 
systems and distributed into appropriate acceptable signals compatible to each user 
(combat and weapon) systems. NAVSSI also provides electronic charting and 
navigational features via COMDAC software. 
NAVSSI is composed of three main elements, the Real Time Subsystem 
(RTS), the Display Control Subsystem (DCS), and the Bridge Work Station (BWS). The 
RTS analyzes navigational data collected from various sources, integrates that data into 
an optimal real-time usable solution and then distributes the information to each user 
system. The RTS works independently of, but in parallel with the DCS. The DCS 
incorporates the hardware and software, which are the navigational features of NAVSSI. 
This component is located in the Navigator's chart-room and is the central workstation 
where shipboard navigation teams manage the system.   The DCS provides a real-time 
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Visual display of ship navigational data and projects this onto a Digital Nautical Chart 
(DNC). The ship's navigator and quartermasters are the primary operators of the DCS. 
The BWS, located on the bridge of the ship, is a remote workstation for 
the DNC. This is the main element of NAVSSI, which will be utilized by bridge watch- 
standers and operational navigation teams. 
NAVSSI is also deployed in three Blocks (Blk), Blk H, Blk m Build 2 and 
Blk HI Build 4 and also a separate distinct version named NAVSSI Lite. The Blk II 
version comprises the majority of the NAVSSI installs to date. This variant does not 
utilize the minimal navigational capabilities required for ECDIS-N compliance and for 
the most part is considered obsolete by this research. NAVSSI Blk m Build 2 and Blk m 
Build 4 incorporate the U.S. Coast Guard Developed COMDAC Software. This software 
allows NAVSSI to perform electronic charting and navigation functions, which will 
enable it to meet ECDIS-N compliance. However, it must be noted that the Blk m Build 
2 version, while incorporating COMDAC software, will not be ECDIS-N compliant and 
requires an upgrade to the Blk m Build 4 version. Only the Blk m Build 4 model, will 
meet the minimum requirements set forth in the ECDIS-N instruction. This model is 
currently greater than 87% compliant with ECDIS-N guidelines. 
NAVSSI Lite is a separate version and distinctly differs from the full 
NAVSSI installation suite.  The distinction is that NAVSSI Lite does not posses any of 
the hardware that provides navigational information to shipboard combat and weapons 
systems.    Also, NAVSSI Lite incorporates COMDAC software and is strictly an 
electronic charting and navigation instrument. This makes NAVSSI Lite a less expensive 
alternative to NAVSSI.  With reduced cost and physical size, NAVSSI Lite is ideal for 
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smaller classes of Navy ships which do not require the capabilities of or have the space 
available to install the full NAVSSI installation. Another benefit of NAVSSI Lite is that 
it retains the COMDAC software, which allows it to remain identical to operating 
NAVSSI. 
b.        Unit Cost 
Table 3.7 presents the unit cost data for the different versions and models 
of NAVSSI. Notice the relatively inexpensive cost for NAVSSI Lite, as compared to the 
Blk DI Build 4 version. The cost to upgrade NAVSSI Lite to the full capabilities of 
NAVSSI is portrayed as "NAVSSI Lite to NAVSSI HI". 
NAVSSI Unit Type Cost in Dollars 
Blk ffl Build 4 $800,000 
Lite 70,000 
Upgrade to Blk III Build 4 
Blk H 500,000 
Blk m Build 2 100,000 
Upgrade from NAVSSI Lite to NAVSSI HI 600,000 
Table 3.7. NAVSSI Unit Costs. 
2.        Pathfinder MK2ECDIS 
Information on the Pathfinder was collected from the following sources: (Refs. 7 
and 19). Additional information was gathered through various corporate press releases. 
a.        System Description 
The Pathfinder MK2 ECDIS was developed by Raytheon Marine a 
subsidiary of Raytheon Corporation. Incorporating COTS PC technology, Raytheon 
Marine has been providing commercial ECDIS technology to the world's merchant fleets 
for almost a decade.   It developed the Pathfinder according to the latest International 
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Maritime Organization (IMO) standards and specifications. The purpose of the 
Pathfinder is to integrate real time positional information, geographic data, and attitude 
sensors into a deck-mounted console suitable for bridge installation. 
The Pathfinder design includes a central processor, high-resolution color 
monitor and several external interfaces. Raytheon markets the ECDIS system as more 
then just digital charts, offering significant additional features for the Pathfinder. These 
features include the following: the ability to interface with shipboard sonar so as to 
present a visual underwater picture, the ability to interface with an autopilot, and helm 
and rudder controls and the additional capacity to receive ARPA inputs projected onto 
radar overlays. 
The Pathfinder MK2 is currently installed on the USS RUSHMORE (LSD 
47) as part of the "Smart Gator" program. This program is similar to the "Smart Ship" 
program that is implemented on the USS YORKTOWN (CG-48). 
Also, Raytheon has been selected as the supplier for the ECDIS system 
and all major components of the IBS components for the Royal Navy's new Type 45 
Destroyer. This contract was valued at approximately $17 million and will cover the first 
three ships of the class, with the first ship being completed by 2007. The cost of this 
contract includes the IBS package and the installation, training and radar upgrades. 
Illustration 3.1 depicts the Raytheon Pathfinder MK2 bridge console. The 
left section displays the digital charting features and the right side exhibits the ARPA 
interface. 
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Illustration 3.1. Raytheon Pathfinder MK2 ECDIS. 
b.        Unit Cost 
Table 3.8 represents the cost of the basic Pathfinder MK2 and the 
complete IBS package. The difference in cost is quite dramatic. 





Table 3.8.       Raytheon Pathfinder MK2 Unit Cost. 
Table 3.9 is a list of fleet units which currently possess a Raytheon ARPA 
system. Note that every aircraft carrier and DDG 51 have one. This represents a total of 
61 ships. 
Fleet Units using Raytheon ARPA 
DDG 51-94 
MCM10-14 
CV 62, 63,64, 67 
CVN68-74&65 
Table 3.9.       Raytheon ARPA Installs. 
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3.        Electronic Chart Precise Integrated Navigation System - Military 
The two primary sources of data for ECPINS-M were obtained from (Refs. 20 and 
21). 
a.        System Description 
Offshore Systems International Ltd manufactures ECPINS-M. Their 
corporate office is located in North Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada and it has been 
developing electronic navigation technologies since 1977. In 1993, it entered the 
commercial market for electronic charting and digital navigation. Unlike most electronic 
charting systems, ECPINS-M has been developed exclusively to meet the requirements 
and demands of the military and will soon meet ECDIS-N standards. Offshore has two 
immediate goals. The first is to continue to produce electronic chart data and systems for 
government agencies, and the second is to serve ECDIS users with a one-stop shopping 
concept for electronic navigation data. This will be accomplished by providing users of 
ECPINS-M with official charting information suited to specific user needs, and providing 
and distributing updates for that data. 
Offshore Systems supplies ECPINS to commercial maritime companies 
and the Royal Canadian Navy, which is installing ECPIN-M on 33 of its vessels. The 
Royal Canadian Coast Guard has outfitted over 39 vessels and the U.S. Coast Guard has 
outfitted their entire fleet of in-service Buoy Tenders over 19 vessels with ECPIN-M 
technology. The U.S. Coast Guard has also signed a contract valued at $874,734, to 
outfit the new Juniper Class Buoy Tenders with ECPINS-M and to also provide a training 
unit. 
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Illustration 3.2 features two different configurations available for 
ECPINS-M. The left side represents the standard bridge console, while the right side 
shows the laptop version, which is intended for smaller vessels. 
Illustration 3.2. Marine Console and Laptop Models of ECPINS-M. 
b.        Unit Cost 
ECPIN-M is available in several different models, each of which has a 
varying degree of capabilities and features. In addition, ECPINS-M is available in a 
standard bridge mounted marine console and also in a laptop. The addition of the DBS 
package (ECPINS R) adds to the standard unit cost significantly as displayed in Table 
3.10. 
ECPINS-M Type Cost in Dollars 
Standard Package Includes Training 
and Documentation 
ECPINS (R) IBS Package 
$90,000 
300,000 
Table 3.10.     ECPINS-M Unit Cost. 
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4.        Voyage Management System-2100M 
The following sources of information contributed to data collected for the Litton 
VMS-2100M, (Refs. 7,15,16,22 and 23). 
a.        System Description 
Sperry Marine was the original designer of the commercial VMS-2100M 
model.   Litton Marine purchased the company in 1996.   The VMS-2100M is unique 
among other commercial ECDIS products, in that it features modular construction. This 
means that the system can be configured to suit user requirements (size and capabilities), 
while also meeting projected budgets. The modular construction design also allows the 
system to grow beyond the initial install, with the ability to easily integrate other 
components or sensors. Another feature of the VMS-2100M is its capability to provide at 
pier training from previously recorded evolutions and sea details.   One of the more 
distinctive features of this system is the incorporation of a video window that can be 
opened on top of the ECDIS display.   The cameras are not part of the original VMS 
package, but could be easily incorporated into future upgrades of the system.   Video 
sensor can be integrated into multiple window displays, including Normal Video, Low 
Light and Sonar Displays. 
The VMS-2100M is currently installed on several different types of U.S. 
Navy vessels. Every U.S. submarine has or is under contract to receive an upgrade to the 
AN/BPS-16 (V) radar, and receive an ARPA and the VMS-2100M ECDIS package. This 
complete package will provide the U.S. submarine fleet with a complete Integrated 
Navigation Suite (INS). An INS is a fully integrated navigation package, but does not 
include the helm and rudder controls found in an IBS package.   However, the new 
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Virginia Class attack submarine is slated to receive a hybrid install. This includes the 
NAVSSI (RTS), but instead of the COMDAC navigation software, she will have the 
VMS-2100M as her ECDIS-N system. Note, that the Virginia Class will be the first class 
of warship designed without a traditional chart locker or a chart table. She will be the 
first ship in the U.S. Navy to navigate with and be completely reliant on an ECDIS-N 
system. 
The VMS-2100M is also part of the U.S. Navy "Smart Ship" program and 
utilizes the full IBS package. Official reports from the USS Yorktown indicate that 
"Smart Ship" technology can reduce operating costs by as much as $2.8 million dollars 
without compromising combat readiness or safety. 
Illustration 3.3 exhibits how the complete IBS package appears for the 
"Smart Ship" configuration. Notice on the left-side image, that monitors are provided for 
the conning officer and the quartermasters. Also there are separate monitors located on 
each bridge-wing, this greatly increase ship safety during navigation details. The right- 
side image depicts ECDIS-N displays located in the Combat Information Center, the 
Navigator's chart room and the Commanding Officer's cabin. 
b.        Unit Cost 
Unit costs for the standard VMS-2100M and the IBS package are 
displayed in Table 3.11. Again, note that the IBS package is much more expensive then 
the basic package. 
Litton Variants Cost in Dollars 
Software, License Fee, Hardware for basic $75,000 
package 
Complete IBS package 1,100,000 
Table 3.11.     Litton VMS-2100M Unit Cost. 
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Illustration 3.3. Different Configurations of VMS-2100M. 
C       IMPORTANT SYSTEM FEATURES 
The data presented in Table 3.12 represent the important user features that are 
inherent to each ECDIS-N system examined in this study. It is also important to note that 
each system possesses a greater category of attributes then those listed. Table 3.12 was 
created so a reader could gauge the basic functions and capabilities existing in each 
system. Additionally, the individual system attributes listed in Table 3.12 correspond to 
only the information that was available while creating the table and is not intended to 
diminish the capabilities of any one system. Other important notes and observations for 
Table 3.12: 
The Defense Information Infrastructure - Common Operating Environment (DU 
COE) rating of "in-progress" for the Pathfinder, ECPINS-M and the VMS-2100M was 
given because no information could be obtained, except that they were capable of 
meeting the requirements.   DH-COE is a collection of reusable software components, 
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software  infrastructure,  guidelines,  standards  and  specifications  with  end-goal  of 
seamless integration and interoperability between hardware and software. 
While the commercial ECDIS-N systems are capable of being encased in different 
grades of shock-tested mountings, NAVSSI appears to be the only system that has gone 
through actual shock testing. 
While NAVSSI is capable of using British Admiralty charts, it is not authorized to 
use them. The civilian systems are authorized to use them for their commercial market 
only. It also must be noted that per the ECDIS-N instruction, all DNC must be originated 
from NMA. 
NAVSSI Lite is not capable of integrating with an ARPA or projecting Radar 
Image Overlays. 
While the main goal and focus for each of the systems is to become compliant 
with ECDIS-N guidelines, it is important to note that none have been certified, but all 
certifications are in progress. It is expected that by late 2001 or early 2002, NAVSSI Blk 
HI Build 4, the VMS-2100M and Pathfinder will be ECDIS-N compliant. No 
information was available on when ECPINS-M will be certified, but it is expected 
sometime in 2002. 
Probably the most difficult guideline to meet in the ECDIS-N instruction, is the 
capability to update NBVIA DNC as to the information contained in the latest edition to 
"Notice to Mariners" while underway. Currently this information is disseminated to the 
fleet via daily message traffic, and weekly and monthly publications conveyed through 
the mail. 
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The Notice to Mariners contains the most recent chart correction data that is 
needed to update the conventional chart library. The Commanding Officer of a ship 
designates certain charts as "ready charts". That is, they are to be maintained at all times, 
according to the corrections of the latest edition to the Notice to Mariners. "Ready 
charts" are the most frequently used charts and constitute the local operating area. With 
the exception of "ready charts" and charts that will shortly be needed, all other 
corrections are cataloged and filed away for future use. The process of manually 
correcting and updating charts is accomplished by Quartermasters and verified by the 
Navigator. 
The problem with automatically updating the digital charts while underway is not 
a problem with system performance, but due to the size of the file that must be 
downloaded. The downloaded file will contain all of the required information needed to 
automatically update the entire digital chart library, according to the latest correction of 
Notice to Marines. The size of this file has been described to be anywhere between 10 to 
30 gigabytes, which translates into long download times. Another limiting factor is the 
capability of individual ships to receive and download the necessary information in a 
timely manner. 
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Important Features NAVSSI Lite Pathfinder ECPINS-M VMS-2100M 
System Information 
UNK Operating System X X 
Windows NT X X X 






Shock Mount Tested X 
Redundant Systems X X X X X 
Approved Digital Chart Sources 
NIMADNC X X X X X 
RNC X X X X X 
British Admiralty Charts X X X 
Voyage Planning & Monitoring 
Tide & Current Calculations X X X X X 
Waypoint Editing X X X X X 
Estimated Time Calculations X X X X X 
Daily Log X X X X X 
Voyage Log X X X X X 
Weather Overlays X X 
Heavy Weather Avoidance X X 
Time to Turn Calculations X X X X X 
Grounding Alarm X 
Predict Vessel Squat X 
Man Over Board Tracking X X X X X 
Seamless Chart Presentation X 
Radar Integration 
ARPA Inputs X X X X 
Target Tracking and Avoidance X X X X 
Position Sources 
GPS X X X X X 
Celestial Inputs X X X X X 
Radar Chart Matching Overlay X X X X 
Running Fix X X X X X 
Estimated Position X X X X X 
Dead Reckoning X X X X X 
Additional Features 
Underwater Hydrographs X X 
4-D Visual Charts X 
Custom Scale Ownership Outline X 
Voyage Recording and Playback X 
Voice and Radar Recording X 
Monitor Locations 
Navigator Chart Room X X X X X 
Bridge Navigator / OOD X X X X X 
Bridge CO X 
Bridge Wings Port / Stbd. X 
Combat Information Center X X 
CO Cabin X 
Integrated Bridge Capability 
Auto-Pilot X X X 
Helm & Rudder Control X X X 
Engine Room Status Display X X X 
Update NIMADNC's 











Ability to Print Paper Charts None None None None None 










Table 3.12.     Individual System Attributes. 
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D.       CURRENT OBSERVED FLEET INSTALLATION STATUS 
Table 3.13 displays the number and class of the observed fleet units, a total of 214 
ships, for this study. Also represented in this table are ships that are planned or under 
construction. The four ECDIS-N systems and the number and class of ships on which 
they are installed on are portrayed. The different categories of U.S. Navy vessels are: 
Combatants (CG-47, DD-963, DDG-51 and FFG-7), Patrol Craft (PC-1), Command 
(LCC and AGF), Amphibious (LPD, LSD and LST), Mine Warfare (MCM, MHC, 
MCS), and Support (AOE, AS and ARS). Also note that of the 78 system installs, only 
12 or 15% will be capable of becoming ECDIS-N compliant. 
NAVSSI is subdivided into three further categories, representing the different 
configurations that are available. NAVSSI Lite is not represented because it is planned 
for, but not yet installed on any vessels. Also note that NAVSSI is primarily located on 
the combatants and that NAVSSI Blk2 comprises 71% of the total NAVSSI installs to 
date. 
The five Litton installs are for the "Smart Ship" program, which includes the IBS 
package. 
While ECPINS-M is widely used by the Royal Canadian Navy and Coast Guard 
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CG-47 27 27 5 
DD-963 21 21 

















214 51            15               6      |         1 5 1 
Table 3.13.     Observed Fleet Installation Status. 
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IV.    ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The previous chapter presented the operating data that is required to perform a 
proper cost analysis. This chapter is divided into five sections labeled A thru E. Section 
A will analyze all of the data relating to ship collisions and groundings. This will include 
the Historical data 1948 - 1988, the Current data 1998 - 2000, and an analysis comparing 
the two. Section B evaluates the cost of "Doing Nothing". Section C examines the data 
presented in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 and notes important observations. Section D 
performs a cost analysis of the current ECDIS-N systems, which are under examination 
and the concluding Section is E, which presents the "Cost-Benefit Comparison". 
A.       NAVY COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS 
An analysis will first be conducted on the Historical data, and then the Current 
data. Finally, an analysis comparing the data from the periods will then be performed. 
1.        Historical Data Analysis 1946 -1988 
The data presented in Chapter HI concerning the Historical trend of Navy 
collisions and groundings, reveal some extremely interesting but worrisome evidence. 
The first and foremost observation is that, while fleet size has decreased at a moderately 
stable rate, especially since 1953, the average number of incidents per year has increased. 
This is contrary to the common belief that fleet size and incidents should be directly 
related to each other. It also indicates that the Navy is getting progressively worse at 
operating ships at sea. 
To examine for a positive relationship between the total number of incidents each 
year and the total number of ships in the fleet for that year, a regression analysis was 
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performed. The two variables, X and Y, were respectively: the total number of incidents 
per year between 1946-1988 and the respective fleet size for each of those years. The 
results of the regression analysis indicated, that there was a 0.014 correlation between 
fleet size and the number of incidents per year. This means that there is no direct 
relationship between the two variables. The results of the regression analysis can also be 
supported by data presented in Charts 3.7 and 3.8. Chart 3.7 in particular clearly displays 
that the average number of incidents per ship per year has dramatically risen over time. 
Chart 3.8 presents a view of the number of ships for every one incident. This table is an 
inverse of Chart 3.7, and depicts a downward slide, which averages at 56.76 ships for 
every one incident and decreases over time or gets worse. 
Further analysis was performed to determine if there was a correlation between 
deployed and non-deployed steaming days per quarter per year and the number of 
incidents per year between 1970 and 1988. This was performed to determine if fleet 
OPTEMPO was a factor in the number of incidents. Again, there was a 0.094 correlation 
between deployed steaming days and incidents and a 0.014 correlation for non-deployed 
steaming days and incidents. Thus the number of incidents is not directly related to either 
the deployed or non-deployed steaming days. 
Also, visual analysis of Charts 3.1 to 3.4 shows an incident rate that has an 
extreme up and down pattern. The total incident rate has sharp peaks, followed by steep 
declines. However, the frequency of occurrence between peaks and troughs also appears 
to be increasing over time. 
44 
The above analysis of Historical data provides a useful perspective on past trends 
of collisions, groundings, total incidents, fleet size and steaming activities. Next, data for 
the most recent three-year period will be analyzed to address the research questions. 
2.        Current Data Analysis, 1998 - 2000 
As illustrated in Table 3.3, there were 17 total incidents between 1998 - 2000, 8 
(47%) of which could have been prevented by an ECDIS-N and ARPA system. The 
combined DON cost of the incidents amounted to $157,187,514, while the total 
preventable costs were $151,579,509. This is significant, because it identifies that the 
preventable costs represent 96.4% of the total expended repair costs for the three-year 
period. With the average fleet size for the three-year period being 322 ships, the Navy 
spent approximately $470,743 per ship, in repair costs from collisions or groundings. 
This equates to an annual expenditure of $162,382 per ship. Not only is this 
unacceptable, it is unaffordable in the view of shrinking DON budget dollars. Clearly the 
situation must be rectified. 
Also notable, it was found that, of the ships involved in the 9 total collisions, only 
one ship was equipped with an ARPA. This ship was making an approach for an 
underway replenishment with a USNS ship and the close lateral separation between the 
two vessels negated the usefulness of the ARPA system, which could not have prevented 
this incident. 
In addition, of the 8 groundings during 1998-2000 none of the concerned vessels 
possessed any type of an ECDIS-N system. This is an important finding because, it 
supports that hypothesis that these systems which are under review, are working to 
provide fleet safety. 
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3.        Analysis of Historic and Current Incidents 
The total analysis of incidents is relevant to many aspects of this study. For one, 
it was essential to establish that none of the ships involved in a preventable incident 
possessed an ARPA or ECDIS-N system. It was easy to state that 47% of the total 
incidents were preventable by such systems, but it was critical to prove that. Without that 
data, the rest would just be conjecture. 
When compared to the Historical trend, the current Navy collisions and grounding 
data exposes some relevant details about the current mishap rate for incidents. 
Data contained in Tables 3.2 and 3.4 are extremely helpful for this analysis. 
While collisions have historically comprised 78% of the total incidents, the average 
collisions between 1998-2000 comprises only 53% of the total incidents. This is 
surprising because the period's average groundings were just slightly below the 
Historical average, while the total incidents were well below the trend. These figures 
could be misleading and necessitate further explanation. 
As established above in the regression analysis of the historical data, there was no 
direct relationship between fleet size and the number of incidents. However, this does 
not imply that if the US Navy shrank to 100 ships, that there would still be 13.53 
incidents per year. That is, fleet size will still have some association to the number of 
possible incidents per year. The US Navy average fleet size for the observed 43-years 
was 768.2 ships, while the current 3-year fleet size average was 322 ships, or 58% 
smaller. This represents a significant reduction in fleet size, and is also the smallest the 
U.S. Navy fleet size has been since 1934. In addition, the average number of incidents 
for the current period was 5.67. 
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To better comprehend the data, the incidents per ship and ships for every one 
incident, between the Current and Historical periods must be examined. The average 
Current data on incidents per ship is practically identical to the Historical average, with 
only a 0.001 difference between the two. While is the Current data on ships for every 
one incident is almost identical, it has increased by 0.18. This means that for the Current 
period, the U.S. Navy has for practical purposes remained statistically average, when 
compared to the Historic Data, even though there was a significant decrease in fleet size. 
An important finding of the study of Historic data found that, while fleet size 
decreased since 1946, the incident rate per ship had dramatically risen, especially since 
1955. Recall that regression analysis established that there was no significant 
relationship between fleet size, steaming hours per quarter and the number of incidents. 
One would think that these factors would be the two principle explanations for incidents 
in such a study. This leaves the Navy with an important question. What is the reason for 
the increase in incidents per ship? 
There are some presumptions that need to explored, some of which may prove to 
be contrary to Navy policy and others would be labeled as intangible, but for the safety of 
the fleet, they should be investigated in the future. Further study should concentrate on 
the following questions: What is the average sea going experience of Commanding 
Officers and Executive Officers as compared to 1946, 1970, and the following years? 
What is the average seagoing experience for Department Heads afloat since 1946, as they 
represent the middle management of ships and are in a direct supervisory position over 
junior officers and are responsible for training them? Has the criteria been lowered for 
selection to these positions and has the draw-down and Surface Warfare exodus of junior 
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and mid-range officers of the 1990s left the Navy with a less capable and experienced 
Officer cadre? Shipboard manning levels since 1946 should also be studied, as they have 
decreased. While it saves money to reduce shipboard manning levels, the amount of 
work needed to operate underway ships remains relatively unchanged. This could have 
an effect on moral and mental awareness when standing watch and potentially become a 
key ingredient for a mishap. Finally, the frequency of occurrence for shipboard 
deployments should be examined and compared to the total incidents per year, to 
determine if there is a correlation. 
B.       ANALYSIS OF "DOING NOTHING" DATA 
As stated in Chapter m, the cost of "doing nothing" equals the annual costs of 
collisions and groundings plus the cost of maintaining conventional paper chart 
inventories. The yearly average cost of collisions and groundings for the Current period 
equated to $52,395,838. 
To obtain a rough estimate on the cost of conventional paper charts, data from 
Table 3.6 is required. Not taking into account the percentage mix of charts onboard ship, 
the average cost of a chart, from the four types listed is: 
($10.25 + $17.00 + $8.50 + $8.50) 
4 = $11.06. 
If the average ship receives approximately 500 charts per year, the annual cost of 
charts per ship equals: $11.06 X 500 = $5,530.00 
This is then multiplied by the average number of ships for the observed three-year 
period, to compute the average annual fleet cost: 
322.67 X $5,530.00 = $1,784,365 
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This figure does not include the cost of navigating instruments or the cost in man- 
hours spent correcting charts (significant increase expected).    So, for the three-year 
period FY98-00, the estimated Navy cost of the "Doing Nothing" option equals: 
($1,784,365 X 3) + $157,187,514 = $162,540,609 
C.       ANALYSIS OF ECDIS-N SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
This section will briefly analyze the ECDIS-N system attributes listed in Table 
3.12. As can be observed, all of the systems have very similar attributes and the basic 
models are also very comparable in price. However, there is a significant price difference 
between the different Integrated Bridge System packages. 
The major weakness of NAVSSI is the unit cost of the BLK 3 Build 4. While a 
good system with many quality features, the price is over ten times higher then the price 
of the Litton VMS-2100M basic model, and only $300,000 cheaper then the full Litton 
IBS version. Another disadvantage of NAVSSI is that it does not incorporate any IBS 
features, which limits its potential growth. 
NAVSSI Lite is a system that can be easily installed on smaller vessels. This was 
the purpose for which it was designed. However, its main drawback is that it does not 
support ARPA integration or Radar Image Overlays onto the charting screen. 
The Pathfinder MK2 and ECPINS-M are also excellent high quality systems. 
Their major drawback is that they are not widely disseminated among naval platforms. 
Since the Navy is trying to reduce the number of different ECDIS-N systems to 
approximately two systems, Pathfinder and ECPINS are at a disadvantage. 
The Litton VMS-2100M appears to be a system that can support future growth 
and expand past the basic install when dollars and time permit. A strong advantage that 
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Litton has over the other three systems is that it is installed on over 100 Naval platforms 
and this number is growing. Plus all theses systems will be ECDIS-N compliant. 
Another benefit of the Litton system is the ability to project heavy weather avoidance 
tracks, a major benefit for an East Coast ship during Hurricane season. 
The main disadvantage of all four systems is the inability to print charts from a 
local printer. This should be a necessity. For example, when ships go "paperless", they 
will not carry any paper charts, how are small boat operations in foreign ports to be 
carried out? Currently, when small-boat operations are conducted, the Navigator 
provides local charts of the area to the boat-officer. This is important for common safety 
for the boat-crew and passengers and is good seamanship. 
Also during navigation-details, the Navigator again provides "chartlets" to the 
Officer of the Deck (OOD), Conning Officer, Commanding Officer, Executive Officer 
and the Bearing Takers. "Chartlets" are photocopied sections of charts that feature the 
ships track during the navigation-detail and are placed in consecutive order (the order that 
they will be used). The benefit they provide to a navigation team is enormous. For 
example, the OOD and Conning Officer can observe the ships progress on the "chartlets", 
while still maintaining vigilance ahead of the ship. For an ECDIS-N system, the Conning 
Officer or OOD would have to move to observe the ECDIS screen, become familiar with 
it, and then try to correlate the information to what he is currently seeing. At certain 
times this may not be practicable, due to external circumstances. Also, "chartlets" allow 
the navigation team to take notes about upcoming evolutions or other important aspects 
of the sea-detail. For shipboard safety, it is therefore important that Navigator be given 
the capability to print specific areas of the digital charts. 
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In summary, all four systems are making progress on meeting ECDIS-N standards 
and should comply with them by late 2001 or early 2002. The main hurdle that faces all 
of them is the difficulty in updating NEMA digital charts with the latest Notice to 
Mariners, while underway. Notice to Mariners is a publication that contains information 
pertaining to the corrections of conventional paper charts. Supervised by the Navigator, 
the Quartermasters make corrections to the Commanding Officers "Ready Charts" and 
also to other needed charts, according to Notice to Mariners. ECDIS-N systems are 
required to receive electronic chart updates, to update the chart library automatically and 
to list a record of corrections. 
D.       COST ANALYSIS 
The cost analysis section will provide an approximate ECDIS-N system cost. 
This section is comprised of three subsections. Subsection one will examine the ECDIS- 
N system cost for combatants. The second Subsection will cover ECDIS-N system costs 
for all Amphibious, Command, Support and Patrol ships. Subsection three will cover 
Mine Warfare Vessels. 
1.        Combatant Cost Analysis 
The combatant cost analysis subsection consists of three parts. Part A will be 
comprised of combatants that require the elements of NAVSSI that distribute 
navigational data to shipboard combat and weapons systems, but not necessarily 
COMDAC software. Part B will consist of combatants that do not need the above- 
mentioned capabilities of NAVSSI. Part C will consist of the total expected cost for 
combatants. 
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Table 4.1 presents all of the combatants that either require (92 ships) or do not 
require (31 ships) certain elements of NAVSSI and also their current ECDIS system 
installation status. It is again important to note that the CG-47 class is comprised of 27 
ships, each of which has a NAVSSI Blk 2 installed. Five of the ships have or in the 
process of converting to the Smart Ship configuration and possess elements of NAVSSI, 
but employ the Litton VMS-2100M for their ECDIS-N system. 











Requires Elements of NAVSSI 
CG-47       27 
DDG-51      44 
DD-963      21 
27 
15                         6 
21 
5 
Total        92 48                15                         6 5 
Does Not Require Elements of NAVSSI 
FFG-7       31  |                                                                   | 1 1 
Table 4.1.       Combatants That Do or Do Not Require Elements of NAVSSI. 
a.        Combatants Requiring Certain Elements ofNA VSSI 
As presented in Table 4.1, 92 combatants require certain elements of 
NAVSSI to provide navigational information to their combat and weapons systems. Of 
the total, 69 of the vessels or 75% currently possess an installed ECDIS system. To 
restate some important facts, only NAVSSI Blk 3 Build 4 and the Litton VMS-2100M 
will be capable of meeting the minimum ECDIS-N criteria. Thus, of the 69 systems 
installed, only 11 ships or 16% will eventually become compliant with ECDIS-N 
guidelines. Of the remaining 58 systems, 43 are regarded as obsolete and 15 will require 
additional funding for upgrades to meet the minimum ECDIS-N standards. 
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Only costs for the Litton VMS-2100M will be examined for the CG-47 
class, because eventually this whole class will be upgraded to Smart Ship technology, in 
accordance with current budget plans. If this upgrade for the entire class is not feasible 
by 2004, then the basic VMS-2100M ECDIS-N system should be installed on the 
remaining vessels. Remember the Litton system is modular and can incorporate future 
upgrades. 
Table 4.2 presents the cost to install the Litton VMS-2100M on the 
remaining 22 of the 27 ships of the CG-47 class. Remember five of the ships already 
possess the Litton VMS-2100M, leaving 22 ships requiring an ECDIS-N system. This 
table shows a break down consisting of 9 ships receiving an IBS package, and 13 ships 
receiving the basic model. This takes into account that a total of $467 million will be 
spent from FY99 to FY05 for Smart Ship improvements fleet-wide (Ref. 9). Table 4.2 is 
based on assumptions that the BBS installations for 9 vessels can be accomplished over 
three years and the remaining 13 vessels can be upgraded to the IBS when time and 
dollars permit. Thus the 22 ships will at least be ECDIS-N capable. 
Litton 
VMS-2100M 












Totals 22 10,875,000 
Table 4.2.       CG-47 Costs for Litton VMS-2100M Systems. 
Table 4.3 displays the costs associated with outfitting the DDG-51 class 
with ECDIS-N. As previously presented in Table 4.1, there are 44 ships in this class, 6 of 
which will be ECDIS-N compliant, and 15 that require upgrades. Additionally 12 of the 
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44 ships are either planned or under construction. To keep this class consistent with only 
one ECDIS-N system, only NAVSSI Blk 3 Build 4 will be considered. It is also 
important to note that NAVSSI does not currently possess the capability to be upgraded 
to an IBS with helm and rudder controls. As stated earlier in Chapter HI, the Virginia 
Class submarine is being built with NAVSSI, but incorporates the Litton VMS-2100M 
for her ECDIS-N system. This could be a cheaper option for the remaining DDG-51 
class, but the cost estimate for this configuration was not available for this research. 
Number Cost in Dollars Total Dollars 
15 
23 




38 Total 19,900,000 
Table 4.3.       DDG-51 Costs for NAVSSI Blk m Build 4 Systems. 
Table 4.4 is the cost of the DD-963 class. The entire class has been 
outfitted with NAVSSI Blk II, but this model is considered obsolete. It does not make 
any financial sense to upgrade this class to a NAVSSI Blk 3 Build 4, due to the $500,000 
upgrade cost. Also, it is still not clear when the last ship of this class will be 
decommissioned. Additionally, this class is not outfitted with an ARPA system. Since 
the full life of these platforms is not known at this time, the lowest cost option is probably 
the best estimate for this class. This makes the NAVSSI Lite system a good option since 
it does not integrate with an ARPA and is the lowest cost system, followed by the Litton 
VMS-2100M (see Table 4.4). It is important to remember that from the Historical data 
analysis collisions comprised 78% of the total incidents from 1946 - 1988. If the DD- 
963 class is to remain in service for a longer period, the remaining ships should be 
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outfitted with an ARPA system and an ECDIS-N system capable of interfacing with it. 
This combination will provide the maximum ship safety. 
Number ECDIS-N System Cost in Dollars Total Dollars 
21 NAVSSILite $70,000 $1,470,000 
21 Pathfinder MK2 80,000 1,680,000 
21 ECPINS-M 90,000 1,890,000 
21 Litton VMS-2100M 75,000 1,575,000 
Table 4.4.       DD-963 Costs for ECDIS-N Systems. 
b.        Combatants Not Requiring Certain Elements ofNAVSSI 
The FFG-7 class does not require a NAVSSI interface, and the cost of the 
Blk3 Build 4 version is very high for this platform. This class is more likely to have a 
greater commissioned service life then the DD-963 class. The reason is that this class 
will be replaced by the planned DD-21 class destroyer and the first will not be built until 
FY04 (Ref. 10). Therefore, it is essential that this class be equipped with an ARPA 
system and an ECDIS-N system capable of interfacing with the ARPA, providing 
maximum ship safety. 
Table 4.5 lists only three ECDIS-N systems and the cost of each system 
for the FFG-7 class. NAVSSI Lite is not considered for this class because of its lack of 
ability to interact with an ARPA. This class should require an ECDIS-N capable system 
that can integrate with an ARPA. Notice the Litton system-again appears to be the best 
choice in terms of cost. 
Number       ECDIS-N System      Cost in Dollars     Total Dollars 
31 Pathfinder MK2 $80,000 $2,480,000 
31 ECPINS-M 90,000 2,790,000 
31 Litton VMS-2100M 75,000 2,325,000 
Table 4.5.       FFG-7 Costs for ECDIS-N Systems. 
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c. Total Expected Combatant Cost 
Table 4.6 details the expected ECDIS-N cost for the four classes of 
combatants, consisting of a total of 112 ships. Theses different ECDIS-N systems are 
selected. Notice the relatively low cost to outfit the DD-963 and FFG-7 class. 
Class Number of 
Ships 
ECDIS-N System Selected Cost in Dollars 
CG-47 22 Litton VMS-2100M $10,875,000 
DDG-51 38 NAVSSIBlk3Build4 19,900,000 
DD-963 21 NAVSSILite 1,470,000 
FFG-7 31 Litton VMS-2100M 2,325,000 
Total Expected Combatant Cost:              | $34,570,000 
Table 4.6.       Total Expected Combatant Cost. 
2.        Amphibious, Command, Support and Patrol Craft Cost Analysis 
This section will cover four categories of ships, which comprise 66 vessels, 
including 12 ships either planned or under construction. Also one vessel is already 
equipped with a Pathfinder Mk2, leaving 65 ships requiring an ECDIS-N system. The 
classes of ships include: LPD, LSD, LST, LCC, AGF, AOE, AS, ARS and PC-1. Only 
one of the three ECDIS-N systems in this section will be ECDIS-N compliant. Due to 
the high unit cost of NAVSSI Blk m Build 4, it was excluded from this section. Also, 
NAVSSI Lite will not be considered because it does not integrate with an ARPA system. 
Table 4.7 displays the costs associated with implementing the various ECDIS-N 
systems. Due to their small size (352 tons), it is recommended that the ships in the PC-1 
class be equipped with a laptop computer based ECDIS-N system. Both the Litton VMS- 
2100M and ECPINS-M are available in this configuration. As indicated in Table 4.7, the 
most cost effective for the above classes of ships is the Litton VMS-2100M. 
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Number        ECDIS-N System      Cost in Dollars    Total Dollars 
of Ships 
65 Pathfinder MK2 $80,000 $5,200,000 
65 ECPINS-M 90,000 5,850,000 
65 Litton VMS-2100M 75,000 4,875,000 
Table 4.7.       Amphibious, Support and Patrol Craft Expected Costs. 
3.        Mine Warfare Vessel Cost Analysis 
Mine Warfare vessels consist of three classes of ships, MCS, MCM and MCS for 
a total of 25 vessels. The USS INCHON (MCS-12) is a much larger ship then the 24 
other vessels in this category and displaces over 18,000 tons, while the displacement of 
the MCM class is 895 tons and MCS class is 1,312 tons. In addition, MCM 10 - 14 are 
equipped with an ARPA system. Therefore, in order to maximize the effectiveness of the 
ECDIS-N and ARPA systems, it is not recommended that the NAVSSI Lite system be 
installed on these ships. Also, NAVSSI Blk 3 Build 4 is excluded because it is too costly 
for these platforms. 
It is important to note that due to the required accuracy of their work, Mine 
Warfare vessels require precise navigational data. The US Coast Guard has equipped all 
their existing fleet of Buoy Tenders (19 Vessels) and their new Juniper Class Buoy 
Tenders with the ECPINS-(R) IBS. The need for buoy tenders to remain on station is the 
reason for the Coast Guard purchase installed IBS technology onto their buoy tending 
fleet. The ECP1NS-(R) IBS was selected for its lower cost as compared to other ECDIS 
UBS packages. Also, the Coast Guard considered ECPINS-(R) IBS was better suited for 
installation on smaller vessels that required the benefits of an IBS. The ECPINS-(R) IBS 
is ideally suited for the Mine Warfare Vessels and the IBS package is far less expensive 
then the Litton and Raytheon IBS systems. It is also interesting to note that although the 
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Coast Guard is the creator of COMDAC, it is reluctant to install COMDAC systems on 
their buoy tenders. 
Table 4.8 presents the cost of ECDIS-N systems for Mine Warfare vessels. Note 
that four ECDIS-N systems are considered including the cost of ECPINS-(R) IBS 
package. Due to the critical nature of their work, it is necessary that the same ECDIS-N 
system be installed on all of the Mine Warfare vessels. Although the Litton VMS-2100M 
appears to be the least expensive, this study recommends the ECPINS-(R) IBS. Again 
due to the nature of their work, exact navigational data should be combined with 
automated ship controls that are in the IBS package. The benefits of an IBS package 
would therefore greatly enhance the safety of the Mine Warfare vessels, and they must be 
outfitted with a system that is best suited for mission accomplishment (potential benefits 
outweigh potential cost). 
Number ECDIS-N System Cost in Dollars Total Dollars 
25 Pathfinder MK2 $80,000 $2,000,000 
25 ECPINS-M 90,000 2,250,000 
25 ECPINS-(R) IBS 300,000 7,750,000 
25 Litton VMS-2100M 75,000 1,875,000 
Table 4.8.       Mine Warfare ECDIS-N System Costs. 
E.       COST-BENEFIT COMPARISON 
The final step in this research study was to combine the cost analyses for each of 
the classes of ships described above. This provides a comprehensive view of the cost 
with the estimated cost savings from avoided repairs and the benefits from 
implementation of ECDIS-N systems. 
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The cost-benefit comparison in Table 4.9 provides the cost the Navy could expect 
to pay for purchasing ECDIS-N systems on the observed classes of ships. The total 
expected cost without installation charges is: $47,195,000. Combatants represent 73% of 
the total cost. The average cost of purchasing an ECDIS-N system per ship is $233,638. 
Category Number Number of Ships Requiring Purchase Cost 
of Ships an ECDIS-N System in Dollars 
Combatant 123 112 $34,570,000 
Amphibious, 66 65 4,875,000 
Command, Support 
and Patrol Craft 
Mine Warfare 25 25 7,750,000 
Total Investment 214 202 $47,195,000 
Estimated Cost Savings From Avoided Repairs $50,526,503 
Table 4.9.       Cost-Benefit Comparison of ECDIS-N Systems. 
It is important to note that total $47,195,000 estimated investment cost for the 
ECDIS-N systems is far less then the total expenditure of $157,187,514 that the Navy has 
spent on repairs due to collisions and groundings between 1998 - 2000. For a more 
reasonable cost-benefit comparison, the $50,526,503 total estimated annual savings from 
avoided repair costs is shown at the bottom of Table 4.9. This average was calculated in 
Table 3.5 from the 1998 - 2000 repair cost data. 
Thus, from the cost-benefit comparison in Table 4.9, the estimated cost savings 
from just a single year more then pays for the ECDIS-N investment.  Note that the $50 
million estimated annual cost savings would be realized annually over the useful life of 
the ECDIS-N systems, which may be five to ten years. Using the shorter life-span, this 
yields $250 million in total cost savings from a $47 million investment, which is about a 
100% average annual rate of return on the investment.   Plus, the cost savings are 
understated because the costs savings for charts are not included. 
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While the purchase cost of the ECDIS-N systems appears to be considerable, it is 
fairly insignificant when compared to the total DON FY01 budget of $91.9 billion. The 
$47,195,000 should not be considered a cost, but should be viewed as an investment to 
help prevent future incidents and reduce the annual costs due to collisions and 
groundings. 
The Navy is currently trying to limit the number of different ECDIS-N products 
to one or two systems. Sometimes the one-size fits all theory does not work or apply, 
especially when mission safety and accomplishment are considered. In this case the 
benefits outweigh the additional unit costs. For this reason, it was concluded that Mine 
Warfare vessels be equipped with an ECPINS-(R) IBS. Each class of ships must be 
equipped with a system that is best suited for the fulfillment mission requirements. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In implementing ECDIS-N fleet wide, the CNO has embarked the Navy on an 
investment program that is essential to transition to new technology in order to improve 
the most basic Naval activity - navigation. ECDIS-N will not only revolutionize current 
Naval navigation practices, but it will also positively affect the safety of navigation. The 
CNO has designated the Navigator of the Navy to assist with this transition and to 
establish the standards for electronic navigation. Hopefully this thesis will help advance 
the discussion of major issues in electronic navigation and lead to effective decisions as 
to implementation of alternative ECDIS-N systems. 
Based on the results of the data analyses and discussions of the findings, this final 
chapter presents major conclusions of this research effort. In addition, the final section 
contains recommendations and identifies areas requiring further research. 
A.       CONCLUSIONS 
It is well known that the fleet size of the U.S. Navy has decreased significantly 
since World War II. Today, at 315 ships, the fleet size is a little more then half the fleet 
size that existed just 15 years ago. What is less well known is that the annual amount of 
collision and grounding incidents over this same time has actually risen. This is 
supported by data gathered for two time periods, 1946 to 1988 and 1998 to 2000, which 
can be interpreted to mean that the Navy's sailing proficiency has decreased. What has 
caused the annual incident rate per ship to increase? There is no apparent answer to this 
question. 
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The Navy averaged 13.53 incidents per year from 1946 to 1988 and, 5.67 
incidents per year from 1998 to 2000. But, while this indicates that the total number of 
incidents has decreased, the average number of incidents per ship for 1998 to 2000 has 
remained virtually identical to the 43-year average (only a 0.001 difference). This 
indicates that there has been no statistical difference in the percentage of ships that are 
involved in incidents between the two data periods. 
Between 1998 and 2000 the Navy was involved in a total of 17 collision and 
grounding incidents, which amounted to a combined repair cost of approximately $157 
million. This equates to an approximate annual cost of $52 million or approximately 
$160,000 per ship. This study has demonstrated that an ECDIS-N system integrated with 
an ARPA could have possibly prevented 47% of the incidents, but could have realized 
96.4% of the total repair costs due to collisions and groundings. If ECDIS-N and ARPA 
systems are not integrated and implemented fleet-wide, the future average incident rate 
per ship is likely to remain close to the historical average. 
This study evaluated ECDIS-N system costs for six main categories of U.S. Naval 
vessels, which represented 214 ships. The categories of U.S. Naval vessels excluded 
from this study were: all submarines, large-deck amphibious ships and all aircraft 
carriers, which equated to 102 ships. 
Several alternative ECDIS-N systems that will comply with the CNO's call for 
standard requirements are currently in use. These have different technology features and 
unit costs. Information on features and capabilities of the various ECDIS-N systems was 
obtained from the manufactures, users, and publicly available sources in order to compare 
the various system attributes for the individual ECDIS-N models. With the exception of 
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NAVSSI Lite, the majority of the models have the same basic fundamental capabilities, 
but they differ in price. Due to the difficulty in obtaining data, installation costs were not 
considered. 
Following a thorough review of the numbers and requirements for the six 
categories of ships, with the exception of installation costs, this study has demonstrated 
that the total purchase cost of the selected ECDIS-N systems was $47,195,000. This 
study has also demonstrated that the Navy can realize an annual savings estimated at $50 
million from the employment of an ECDIS-N and ARPA system. The projected cost 
savings represents the preventable cost of the total amount spent on repairs to vessels 
involved in collisions and groundings. The purchase cost is 10% less then the 
approximate annual repair cost and this investment is relatively insignificant when 
compared to the $91.9 billion Navy FY 2001 budget. 
This study concludes that not only is ECDIS-N affordable to the Navy, the Navy 
also cannot afford to delay shipboard installation for the ships examined in this research. 
Also, this study finds that overall the Litton VMS-2100M system is the best product for 
the investment dollars. Since the VMS-2100M is already part of the "Smart Ship" 
program, any ship that installs the basic model, will have the potential to be upgraded to 
the full Integrated Bridge System. This is an added benefit if the Navy eventually 
implements the "Smart Ship" program fleet-wide. 
Additionally, the research supports selection of more than one alternative ECDIS- 
N model, because the "one size fits all" approach does not apply. Each class of ship must 
have an ECDIS-N system that is best suited to her mission requirements. For example, 
due to the sensitivity of their mission, Mine Warfare vessels demand an ECDIS-N system 
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that can support an Integrated Bridge System. This study concludes that the ECPIN-(R) 
IBS system is best suited to Mine Warfare vessels, even though this model is not the least 
expensive. 
B.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research recommends that the current procurement of the Litton VMS- 
2100M be accelerated and deployed on as many ships as practicable. In view of the tight 
defense dollars, the implied cost savings and safety improvements more then justify 
budget allocations. Also, ARPA installations are recommended for ships still lacking the 
system, because this thesis has demonstrated that an ECDIS-N and ARPA integration 
provides the highest degree of safety to vessels. 
Given the unexpected increase of incidents involving collisions and groundings, it 
is recommended that the Navy conduct an in depth study regarding the cause of the 
incidents and the reason for the increasing trend of incidents. This research studied what 
effects Fleet Size and Operating TEMPO had on the incident rate, but the data analysis 
could not determine that these factors were statistically related to the number of incidents 
per year. As already stated, some additional areas of research should center on the 
quality of officers retained in the Surface Warfare community, shipboard manning levels, 
the frequency of deployments and the seagoing experience of senior and mid-grade 
officers. The file size required to update corrections to NTMA DNC must be reduced, in 
order to make it possible for all fleet units to be able to receive an update underway, in a 
timely manner. The majority of fleet units does not require or directly benefit from an 
update that includes their entire chart library, which is global. This thesis recommends 
that NIMA maintain the updated and current library at a central database and that it be 
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accessible to the fleet via the Internet. A ship can then identify the charts the she will be 
utilizing from a web page so that the current corrections for those specific charts are 
automatically downloaded. This way the only correction that N1MA should 
automatically transmit to fleet units are those identified "ready charts". If a vessel is 
underway and unable to access the Internet, she can email a request to NTMA identifying 
charts that she will need to have updated. NIMA can then transmit the required 
information to the ship. This can substantially decrease the average file size that is 
required by each ship. 
Often it is only necessary to use a small segment or portion of a larger chart. This 
study recommends that ECDIS-N systems be able to interface with printers, so that 
system operators can print selected sections of digital nautical charts. 
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